News, 20 June 2025
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently enacted a series of regulatory actions designed to safeguard domestic communication infrastructure and equipment from adversarial foreign entities. These measures also aim to identify and address security vulnerabilities within the communications supply chain. The new rules will affect telecommunications carriers, service providers, equipment manufacturers, and associated industries.
Collectively, these oversight and transparency initiatives seek to diminish the influence of foreign adversaries on critical telecommunications infrastructure and supply chains, thereby mitigating risks of cyberattacks, espionage, and surveillance.
Enhanced Ownership Disclosure for FCC Licensees
The FCC has proposed new regulations through a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to establish a standardized reporting system for ownership. This broadened requirement would compel a wider range of FCC licensees, authorization holders, and approved entities to disclose ownership interests, specifically to identify stakes held by foreign adversaries.
Entities subject to these proposed reporting requirements would include most wireless licensees, lessees, spectrum auction applicants, domestic and international Section 214 authorization holders, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers with FCC numbering authorizations, spectrum frequency coordinators, holders of Data Network Identification Codes (DNIC) and International Signaling Point Codes (ISPC), recognized operating agencies under the International Telecommunication Convention, and Eligible Telecommunications Carriers (ETC) benefiting from the Universal Service Fund.
The new regulations would require disclosing foreign ownership or control by entities linked to foreign adversaries. A “foreign adversary” is defined as any foreign government or non-governmental group identified by the Secretary of Commerce as having consistently acted against U.S. national security or the safety of U.S. citizens.
Restrictions on Foreign Adversary Control of Testing and Certification
To bolster national security, the FCC has adopted rules that bar foreign adversary entities from having ownership or control over telecommunications certification and testing organizations. This prohibition extends to entities already on the FCC’s Covered List, those identified as Chinese military companies by the DOD, organizations on the executive branch’s “foreign adversaries” list, and any other entities flagged by federal agencies for posing national security threats.
Extending the Covered List to Connected Vehicle Technologies
In an effort to address potential national security concerns, the FCC is seeking public input on a proposed expansion of its Covered List. This expansion would target connected vehicle technologies, specifically automated driving systems (ADS), entire connected vehicles (CVs), and vehicle connectivity systems (VCS) hardware that originate from, or are controlled by, entities in the People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Macau) or the Russian Federation.
This proposal builds upon a recent final rule from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which determined that ADS software, completed CVs, and VCS hardware from Chinese- or Russian-controlled entities pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security and safety.
While the FCC “tentatively” believes that ADS and complete CVs may not fall under its equipment authorization process, it considers VCS hardware to be subject to this process. If added to the Covered List, future applicants for VCS hardware authorization would need to confirm that their technologies are not sourced from entities controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction of China or Russia. The definition of VCS hardware would specifically refer to technologies “intended to be included within a completed CV” that are telematics control units, contain integrated covered software, or utilize spectrum in the 5.895-5925 GHz band. The FCC is seeking input on whether these criteria and the proposed addition align with BIS’s national security risk assessment for VCS hardware.
